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Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgments are relative to the individual or culture. When stated so vaguely relativism is embraced by numerous lay persons and a sizeable contingent of philosophers. Other philosophers, however, find the thesis patently false, even wonder how anyone could seriously entertain it.Both factions are on to something, yet both miss something significant as well. Those who whole‐heartedly embrace relativism note salient respects in which ethics is relative, yet erroneously infer that ethical values are noxiously subjective. Those who reject relativism do so because they think ethics is subject to rational scrutiny, that moral views can be correct or incorrect. But in rejecting objectionable features of relativism they overlook significant yet non‐pernicious ways in which ethics is relative.In short, each side harps on the opponent's weaknesses while overlooking its own flaws. That is regrettable. We are not forced to choose between relativism and rationality. We can have both. There are ways in which ethical principles and behavior vary legitimately from culture to culture and individual to individual. That we must recognize. However this in no way suggests we cannot reason about ethics. Rather we should strive for a rational yet relativistic ethic which emphasizes the exercise of cultivated moral judgment rather than the rote application of extant moral rules. Or so I shall argue.

PurposeThe constructs of relativism and absolutism have a significant role to play in the development of ethical theory; however, they are commonly simplified in their depictions and are philosophically more complex than we give them credit for. The purpose of this paper is to undertake an in‐depth examination of ethical relativity and ethical absolutism before concluding with a discussion of which research implications warrant further investigation.Design/methodology/approachA descriptive, historical, anthological approach has been taken.FindingsEthical relativism is regrettably subject to a proliferation of related terminology and, in many instances with different meanings ascribed to similar terms. In addition, ethical relativity appears to attract different research perspectives that are heavily dependent on their academic origins. A clear distinction needs to be made between ethical and situational relativity. It is suggested that relativism is present in the process of moral justification and that ethical relativism should be analyzed from three levels: the individual level, the role and group level, and the cultural levels. The over‐riding objection to ethical relativism rests on the consequences of accepting relativism, which undermines the existence and strength of global moral standards and the inherent positioning of ethical absolutism. Absolutism does not deny the existence of multiple moral practices evident around the world, but proposes that variations in ethical actions could still be rooted in common universal moral standards based on our requirements as human beings and the necessities of long‐term survival.Research limitations/implicationsThe ensuing discussions of relativism and absolutism open up a rich vein of research opportunities and suggest caution is required in regard to research methodologies. From a methodological perspective, care needs to be taken. For example, using hypothetical ethical dilemmas that are often unrelated to a specific industry or cultural setting has resulted in many researchers observing situational relativity rather than true ethical relativity.Originality/valueThis paper specifically examines whether there are differences in underlying and basic moral standards even though similarities in ethical behaviour have been determined, or whether differing ethical actions could, as the absolutists believe, originate from common universal standards despite apparent differences in perceptions and actions across cultures.

The adoption of ethical relativism as the working assumption of social science is not justified by the evidence. The assumption usually rests upon authorities from sister disciplines, but these are rarely specified. Most social scientists have abandoned the commonsense view that the scientific study of man can contribute to his happiness by helping him formulate appropriate social & individual goals & choose the right means of achieving them. Rather, they usually demonstrate excessive confidence in scientific facts & methods &, conversely, profess excessive scepticism about the fruitfulness of any attempt to resolve issues of value. Modified HA.

The aim of this paper is to explain how ethical relativism leads to a process of legal "absolutism"', and to the breakdown of a democratic system. The recovery of ethical objectivity, brought about by a metaphysical conception, belongs to a progressive relativism of Law, and to a healthy sense of democracy. The claim far absolute truth and absolute values prevents an absolutism of Law and sets the foundations of a legal partiality capable of making Law relative once again. ; La intención de este trabajo es mostrar cómo el relativismo ético conduce a un proceso de absolutización del derecho y a la del sistema democrático. La recuperación del objetivismo ético, propio de la concepción del mundo metafísica, se corresponde con una progresiva relativización del derecho, y con un sano sentido democrático. La reivindicación de la verdad y los valores absolutos impiden el absolutismo del derecho y fundamentan un personalismo jurídico capaz de relativizar de nuevo lo jurídico.

Le relativisme éthique et l'étude des valeurs politiquesDepuis quelques années, de nombreux politicologues se sont laissés persuader de réprimer leurs penchants réformistes, au moins dans le cadre de leur profession. Cette auto-répression a été produite par leur adoption de la doctrine du relativisme éthique qui a prédominé dernièrement dans les sciences sociales en Amérique du Nord et en Europe. Cette doctrine se manifeste par une censure methodologique qui soutient que l'analyse scientifique est en elle-même incapable de produire des jugements sur la valeur des choses. L'acceptation de cette censure méthodologique a conduit les analystes non seulement à abandonner la recherche traditionnelle de ce que l'on pourrait appeler « des standards objectifs de valeur dans la nature » mais elle a aussi empêchê le développement des recherches sur les origines et la signification des jugements de valeur.L'examen des fondements de cette censure méthodologique suggère qu'elle est fondée sur des postulats hautement spéculatifs plutôt que sur des évidences empiriques concluantes. L'examen des raisons techniques avancées à l'appui de cette censure, c'est-à-dire l'argumentation baseé sur une logique propositionnelle, révèle que cet argument ne s'adresse pas à la question fondamentale et est donc une raison insuffisante pour restreindre nos recherches de la façon prescrite par cette approche. De même l'examen de la théorie émotive des valeurs et la base empirique sur laquelle elle est fondée, révèle que son fondement est plutôt faible. Elle semble tenir sa force d'un mode particulier d'interprétation des comportements présupposant la subjectivité des valeurs, ce qui est précisément l'objet de cet article. Et finalement, l'examen des raisons du rejet d'une autre possibilité—celle de l'existence des critères objectifs de valeurs discernables dans la nature—montre que ce rejet n'a qu'une base empirique fragmentair e et non concluante.Il semble que ce rejet soit fondé sur un postulat méthodologique ou sur des hypothèses métaphysiques ou épistémologiques qui peuvent être vrais mais qui ne peuvent prétendre avoir été démontrés empiriquement de façon décisive. Et puisque ces postulats semblent contredire l'expérience telle que saisie par le sens commun, il est raisonnable de conclure que leur adoption n'est pas conforme aux exigences empiriques de la science moderne.Il appert donc que l'influence considérable que la doctrine du relativisme éthique a eu sur les études politiques récentes a rétréci leurs perspectives et les a détournées de manière injustifiée de ce qui peut être considéré comme leurs véritables objectifs.

We believe that the "plane of objective reality" and the "plane of subjective conscience" do not exclude each other in the ethical or evaluating world. A society's values that are compiled in a Constitution and its laws are rational and objective realities, but if they are going to be established they need a rational subject. We have been moving away -perhaps too much so-from the objectivity of law and we have delegated excessively in the evaluative conscience of a judge. This implies that judges create laws because they can move away from the "natural meaning of the text" in specific cases where legal loopholes exist by either creating general norms or by interpreting general norms and principles to create individual norms. In any case, I believe it is beneficial to reduce that judicial power by increasing the objectivity of laws through the implementation of good legislative and with has called "collective values ". ; En el mundo ético o valorativo creemos que no son excluyentes ni contrapuestos el plano de la "realidad objetiva" y el de la "conciencia subjetiva". Los valores que la sociedad recoge en su Constitución y en sus leyes son realidades racionales y objetivas, pero para su determinación precisan de un sujeto cognoscente. Hoy día nos hemos ido alejando, tal vez demasiado, de la objetividad de la ley y hemos ido decantando todo el derecho en la conciencia valorativa de los jueces. De esta manera se entiende que los jueces crean derecho bien porque puedan alejarse del "significado natural del texto"; bien porque en determinados casos -en presencia de lagunas- puedan crear normas generales; bien porque, mediante la interpretación de la norma general y de los principios, puedan crear normas individuales. En cualquier caso creo conveniente limitar ese poder judicial, reforzando la objetividad de la ley desde una buena técnica legislativa y desde lo que Alexy ha venido llamando "valores de la colectividad".